







Most writers on the ethics of belief adopt some version of evidentialism, roughly the view that one 
should limit one’s beliefs to the evidence one has for their truth.1  William James, particularly in 
his paper “The Will to Believe”, has traditionally been seen as a critic of evidentialism, with his 
claim that “Our passional nature not only lawfully may, but must, decide an option between 
propositions, whenever it is a genuine option that cannot by its nature be decided on intellectual 
grounds”2 being understood as saying that in certain cases we have the right to believe beyond 
what is certified by the evidence. 
 
However, there is an alternate, “expansive”, reading of James that portrays him not as criticizing 
evidentialism itself, but only as trying to expand our conception what we should count as evidence.  
So, for instance, Scott Aikin and Robert Talisse argue that the kind of cases James supports his 
view with are “not exceptions to evidentialism (but rather involve a pragmatist expansion of the 
concept of evidence)”,3 and in her The American Pragmatists, Cheryl Misak argues: 
 
what James was trying to do was not to refute evidentialism but, rather, to expand the concept of what can count 
as evidence for the truth of a belief.… one of the ways in which James wants to expand the concept of evidence 
is to include as evidence the satisfaction of the believer.  (Misak 2013, p. 63.) 
 
While this “expansive” reading James has become increasingly prominent, the prima facie case 
against it obvious.  If James had wanted to expand the concept of evidence, he could have said so, 
and while he often speaks of beliefs legitimately going beyond the “literal”, “scientific” or 
“objective” evidence,4 he never goes on to say that they manage to do so based upon “non-literal”, 
“non-scientific” or “non-objective” evidence.  Indeed, he never describes the passional 
contributions to belief as “evidence”, and Misak’s suggestion that James “wants to broaden the 
scope of “intellectual grounds” so that they include the passional”5 sits ill with his canonical 
statement above which states that the passional contribution is licit precisely in cases which cannot 
by their nature “be decided on intellectual grounds”. 
 
1 For a general discussion of evidentialism, see Chignell 2018. 
2 James 1897, p. 20. 
3 Aikin and Talisse 2018, p.63.  (See also Aikin 2014, p. 84.) 
4 As Misak notes (2013, p. 67).   





So what would motivate the expansive reading?  I’ll be focusing on two strategies here.  The first, 
‘internal’ approach relies on showing that the logic of James’s argument itself relies on 
highlighting a new type of evidence rather than rather than undermining the need for our beliefs 
to be grounded in evidence, while the ‘external’ approach appeals to aspects of James’s biography 
to show that he always intended something closer to the expansive reading. 
 
1. The ‘Internal’ Argument: Doxastically Efficacious Beliefs 
 
The ‘internal’ argument for the expansive reading of James has two steps. The first is to argue that 
James’s criticisms of evidentialism are limited to “doxasticaly efficacious” cases, that is, cases 
where believing that P can contribute the ultimate truth of P.6  (The most famous instance of this 
being his “mountain climber”, whose confidence in his ability to make the leap contributes to his 
success in doing so.). The second step is to argue that in such cases, our awareness of this efficacy 
allows us to count our belief that P as evidence for its truth.  Aikin and Talisse present a clear case 
of this strategy: 
 
As Richard Gale terms it, the subject makes a “knowing self-induction” (1980). However, notice something 
important about this case. Assuming that the subject is right about the doxastic efficacy of her belief, she also has 
a reason counting in favor of p’s truth. In this case, it is the believer’s own mental state that will by hypothesis 
make p more likely. Her belief, then, is evidence that p. (Aikin & Talisse 2018, p. 66).  
 
Sometimes, beliefs are doxastically efficacious, and when they are, having the belief and being aware of their 
efficacy is itself evidence for the belief’s truth.  (Aikin & Talisse 2018, p. 67) 
 
However, there are problems with both parts of this strategy.  First of all, while James was always 
fascinated by cases in which “faith in a fact can help create the fact”,7 his statement of his views 
in “The Will to Believe” never brings this factor in as something that should be required in addition 
to the question’s representing an evidentially undetermined genuine option.  Doxastically 
efficacious cases may be ones in which James takes passional belief to be justified as well, but its 
much more plausible to think that the cases he views the contribution of our passional nature to be 
justified to be a union (rather than an intersection) of these two sets of cases.8  After all, given that 
“James’s endgame for “The Will to Believe” is a justification of religious faith,”9 if his view really 
 
6 Aikin 2014, p. 84, Aikin & Talisse pp. 63, 64, 72, 75. ( See also Gale 1999, pp. 113-114.) 
7 James 1897, p. 29. 
8 See Jackman 1999. 




were that we were only entitled to believe in  God if God’s existence depended upon our believing 
in him, then his views would provide very cold comfort to the would-be religious believer.10   
 
This brings us to the second part of the internal argument, the assumption that the relevant beliefs 
are, for James, “reflective”,  that is, the relevant believers are consciously aware of the effect that 
their believing has on the truth of those beliefs.  It is, admittedly, tempting to understand 
“doxastically efficacious” cases like this, and many presentations of James’s mountain climber 
describe him in just this way.11  However, when we look at James’s own descriptions of such cases, 
such reflections seem entirely absent.  The climber is only described as having “hope and 
confidence”12  that he will succeed, and he never goes through any reflection about how this 
confidence itself will help get him across.  Further, even if James’s believers were ‘reflective’, it’s 
hard to see why this would be enough to make the cases fit the evidentialist model.  James describes 
cases where confidence makes success more likely, and perhaps even cases where confidence is 
necessary for success, but for the reflective cases to fit the evidentialist model, one’s confidence 
would need to make one’s success highly likely, and James never describes belief as being that 
effective.13   Indeed, for the cases that James often focuses on (such as, say, whether Good will 
ultimately triumph over Evil), knowing that you can contribute to the outcome is a far cry from 
knowing that one’s confidence can assure it.  Our beliefs may nudge things in the direction we 
want, but to meet the evidentialist standard, we would need much more than a nudge.  Even worse 
for the ‘reflective’ reading of James, reflection on the doxastic efficacy of one’s beliefs only helps 
one meet the evidentialist standard if one has evidence for this efficacy, and while we may now 
have evidence for this in ‘athletic’ cases such as the mountain climber, James’s central concern 
was religious belief, and while he certainly thought that such efficacy was possible in the religious 
case,14 he never suggests that we have evidence for that being so.15   
 
 
10 Especially since the the “sick soul” that James is often so concerned with needs something more than this 
‘melioristic’ conception of religion. 
11 See, for instance, Aikin & Talisse, p. 69, Jordan 1996 pp. 412-413, Pojman 1993 p. 543, Gale 1999, p. 112. 
12 James 1897, p. 80.  
13 For a clear discussion of a case where confidence is necessary for success, but still leaves one with only a small 
probability of it, see Zimmerman 2018, p. 128. 
14 James 1897, p. 55. 
15 Though, of course, the fact that the scope of the doxastically efficacious cases is unknown would be a reason 




It seems then, that while one’s awareness of one’s being in a doxastically efficacious case could 
be used to make some new evidence available, there is little reason to think that this sort of 
evidence is what was being appealed to in “The Will to Believe”. 
 
 
3. The External Argument: The Duty to Believe and James’s ‘Duel’ with Chauncey Wright 
 
The ‘external’ argument for the expansive reading requires us to go back the very start of James’s 
academic career.  One natural reason for thinking that James wasn’t any sort of evidentialist was 
that he typically expressed his views in terms of our having a right to believe beyond what the 
evidence compelled us to.16  Indeed, he later suggested that “The Right to Believe” would have 
been a more appropriate title for his paper.17 However, if he really was an ‘expansive evidentialist’ 
we wouldn’t’ expect this sort of permissive talk.  If our subjective preferences really were a sort 
of evidence, it would seem as if we would have not just a right to believe in accordance with them, 
but an actual duty to do so.  Consequently, on the expansive evidentialist reading, one should 
expect James to think that we had a duty to believe what was in our interests. 
 
It is, then, not surprising that the claim that James had, at some deeper level, a commitment to 
some sort of “duty to believe” view has a number of supporters among defenders of the ‘expansive’ 
reading,18 and Misak has argued that James was aware of this commitment himself.  She make a 
case for this by placing a lot of emphasis on the one occasion where James did seem to explicitly 
put forward a ‘duty to believe’ view, namely, his unsigned 1875 review of Tait and Stewart’s The 
Unseen Universe in The Nation, where James claimed that if a belief in the supernatural order was 
evidentially underdetermined, then “any one to whom it makes a practical difference (whether of 
motive to action or mental peace) is in duty bound to . . . it.”19  Of course, giving a single line in a 
short anonymous book review written before he published any of his main philosophical (or even 
 
16 As when James says at the start of his paper that it is “a defence of our right to adopt a believing attitude in 
religious matters, in spite of the fact that our merely logical intellect may not have been coerced.”  (James 1897, p. 
13, italics mine), or when in Pragmatism he describes that paper as “an essay on our right to believe” (James 
1907, p. 124). 
17 He makes the suggestion that this would be a better title than his “luckless” and “unfortunate” choice “The Will to 
Believe” in his letters (C 10: 434, 449), where he also proposes “A Defense of Faith” (C 8: 476), and “A Critique 
of Pure Faith” (C 8: 493, C: 9: 552) as preferable options. 
18 In addition to Aikin, Misak and Tallise, Gale 1999 defends the claim that James saw a duty to believe in this area. 




psychological) works 20  precedence over all the more considered views presented in his later 
philosophical writings would take some justification, but Misak argues21 that we can find this 
justification in Chauncey Wright’s account of his encounter with James after the publication of the 
1875 Nation review.  On this reading, James (in his heart of hearts) always clung  to something 
like the “duty to believe” view, but drew back from it in print because he was “bullied” by an 
“onslaught” of criticisms from Wright,22 and “this early tussle supports an interpretation of ‘The 
Will to Believe’ in which the point is to expand the scope of evidence so as to include the 
consequences that a belief has on one’s life.”23 
 
Misak argues that James’s true intentions can be seen in the account that Wright gives of their 
“duel” in his letter to Grace Norton, the relevant portion of which runs as follows: 
 
I have carried out my purpose of giving Dr. James the two lectures I had in store for him. I found him just returned 
home on Wednesday evening. His father remarked in the course of talk, that he had not found any typographical 
errors in William’s article. . . . I said that I had read it with interest and had not noticed any typographical errors. 
The emphasis attracted the youth’s attention, and made him demand an explanation, which was my premeditated 
discourse. . . . He fought vigorously, not to say manfully; but confessed to having written under irritation . . . On 
Friday evening I saw him again and introduced the subject of the ‘duty of belief ’ as advocated by him in the 
Nation. He retracted the word ‘duty’. All that he meant to say was that it is foolish not to believe, or try to believe, 
if one is happier for believing. But even so he seemed to me to be more epicurean (though he hates the sect) than 
even the utilitarians would allow to be wise . . . He quite agrees that evidence is all that enforces the obligation of 
belief, and that it does this only in virtue of its own force as evidence. Belief is only a matter of choice, and 
therefore of moral duty, so far as attending to evidence is a volitional act; and he agreed that attention to all 
accessible evidence was the only duty involved in belief.24 
 
According to Misak, while James “altered his position in light of this onslaught”, and switched his 
talk of “duty” to talk of “right”, the fact that he had to be “bullied” into doing so is “significant” 
and “puts the anti evidentialist interpretation into question” (Misak 2013, p. 63). 
 
However, when we look at Wright’s letters more closely, we see that far from revealing James’s 
“original intent,”25 (an intent that he fought “vigorously”, if unsuccessfully, to maintain in the face 
of Wright’s criticisms), the talk “duty” in his 1875 review was never particularly important to 
James, and the ‘right to believe’ doctrine was always more central to him. 
 
20 Even very early papers like “Remarks on Spencer’s Definition of Mind as Correspondence” and “The Sentiment 
of Rationality” were still three years away at this point. 
21 In Misak 2013, 2015, 2016. 
22 Misak, 2013, p. 65, 2015 p. 120. 
23 Misak 2016, pp. 65-66.  
24 The passage appears in Misak 2013, p. 63, Misak 2015, p. 120, and Misak 2016, pp. 65-66. 





In particular, Wright’s letter describes two days of debate with James (a Wednesday then a Friday), 
and while Misak presents this all being about the ‘duty of belief’,26 a more extensive examination 
of Wright’s correspondence shows this not to be the case.  We see a sign of this in the initial letter 
quoted above when Wright claims that he only “introduced the subject of the ‘duty of belief’” on 
the Friday, suggesting that the vigorous debate two days before was about something else entirely, 
a suggestion reinforced by the letter’s opening line where he claims to have had “two lectures” in 
store for James. 
 
So what else could their Wednesday debate have been about?  Fortunately, Wright answers this 
question himself in another letter (also to Grace Norton) written six days earlier, in which he writes: 
 
When Dr. William James gets back from his journeys I shall have two bones to pick with him.  One we have — 
that is, you and I have — talked about and happily agreed upon, namely, his doctrine in the Nation about the duty 
of belief.  The other is in a book-notice by him, in the North American Review, of Wundt’s psysio-psychology.    
In a paragraph in which he distinguishes and compliments me among the “empiricists,” he has so badly 
misapprehended what the experience philosophy in general holds and teaches, that the compliment to me goes 
for nothing in mitigation of my resentment…27 
 
This letter make it clear that Wright’s attention was caught not just by James’s review of The 
Unseen Universe, but also by his review on Wundt’s 1875 Gundzüge Der physioligischen 
Psychologie.28  In that review, he speaks favorably of Wright, but is generally critical of the 
“experience philosophy” for treating experience as too passive.  It seems likely that it is this later 
article on empiricism, and not the one of the ‘duty to believe’ that Wright tells James contains no 
typographical errors, and about which the two engaged in such vigorous debate on Wright’s initial 
Wednesday visit to the James household.  This is clear not only from the fact that Wright claims 
to have “introduced” the subject of the duty to believe on the Friday, but also by Wright’s 
description of the Wednesday debate, which includes a line (omitted by Misak) where Wright 
claims that James “referred to the compliment” to him in that article, to which Wright rejoined 
“Made at the expense of my friends!”29  There is no compliment, or mention, of Wright in the 
 
26 The impression is also given in Madden 1963 pp. 44-46 (Misak’s cited source for the letter from Wright) and 
Madden 1979, p. xvii.  (Since delivering this paper, I’ve learned that Wernham (1987) criticizes Madden on much 
the same grounds that I use to criticize Misak here, and while I’m unpersuaded by his arguments that James 
doesn’t endorse a ‘right to believe’ view, on this particular topic, he seems to have things exactly right.) 
27 Letter to Grace Norton, July 12, 1875, quoted in Perry 1935, pp. 529-530. 
28 James 1875b. 




review of Tait, but there is a clear compliment of Wright in the Wundt review, and (as we saw in 
his letter of July 12) Wright did not particularly appreciate it. 
 
With the Wednesday debate taken up by the review of Wundt, the entire ‘duel’ over the duty to 
believe must be found in their Friday meeting, but the description of that day’s debate doesn’t 
really provide any evidence that James was particularly attracted to the “duty to believe” view.  
When Wright questions James about the use of “duty”, James shows no real concern with 
defending that terminological choice at all, giving it up with no apparent fight and saying only that 
“All he meant to say was that it is foolish not to believe, or try to believe, if one is happier for 
believing.”30  This phrasing suggest that James is not admitting to any change of mind on this issue.  
Rather, he is only admitting that what he wrote did not aptly capture what he originally had in 
mind.  This suggests that the “original intent” behind James’s 1875 review corresponds roughly to 
his later doctrine that, even if it isn’t a “duty”, it is “the part of wisdom”31 to believe what is in 
one’s interest in such evidentially underdetermined cases.   
 
Further, on the question of our having a right to believe in these cases, Wright seems to have been 
brought around to James’s side (if he wasn’t there already) writing to Norton that at the end of the 
Friday debate: 
 
I allowed that unproved beliefs, unfounded in evidence, were not only allowable, but were sometimes even fit, 
becoming or appropriate to states of feeling or types of character, which are deserving of approval or even honor.  
This fitness does not, however, amount to an obligation or duty.32 
 
It seems, then, that Wright was, in allowing the legitimacy of beliefs that were “unfounded in 




The debate between “evidentialists” and “pragmatists” is still very much alive in epistemology 
today, 34  and while I haven’t focused here on the strength of James’s arguments against 
 
30 Letter to Grace Norton, July 18, 1875, quoted in Perry 1935, pp. 531-532, italics mine. 
31 James 1897, pp. 53, 80. 
32 Letter to Grace Norton, July 18, 1875, quoted in Perry 1935, pp. 531-532. 
33 One should also note that while Wright’s original letter describes James as successfully sticking to his guns on the 
right to believe question, he portrays him as agreeing that “evidence is all that enforces the obligation of belief”, 
so whatever grounds this right for James, he doesn’t consider it a type of evidence. 




evidentialism, I hope to have at least shown that he was a precursor to our more contemporary 








2019, McCormick 2015 and Zimmerman 2018 on the pragmatist. 
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